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This study tests two opposing hypotheses about the 
impact of aid fragmentation on the practice of aid tying. 
In one, when a small number of donors dominate the aid 
market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly 
power by tying more aid to purchases from contractors 
based in their own countries. Alternatively, when donors 
have a larger share of the aid market, they may have 
stronger incentives to maximize the development impact 
of their aid by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly 
and consistently support the latter hypothesis. The key 
finding—that higher donor aid shares are associated with 
less aid tying—is robust to recipient controls, donor 
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fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation. 
When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on 
corruption perception indexes, higher shares of aid are 
significantly related to lower aid tying only in the less-
corrupt sub-sample. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that aid tying can be an efficient response by 
donors when losses from corruption may rival or exceed 
losses from tying aid. When aid tying is more costly, 
as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less 
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Abstract
This study tests two opposing hypotheses about the impact of aid fragmentation on the
practice of aid tying. In one, when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in
a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more aid to purchases from
contractors based in their own countries. Alternatively, when donors have a larger share
of the aid market, they may have stronger incentives to maximize the development impact
of their aid by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the latter
hypothesis. The key nding - that higher donor aid shares are associated with less aid tying
- is robust to recipient controls, donor xed eects and instrumental variables estimation.
When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes,
higher shares of aid are signicantly related to lower aid tying only in the less-corrupt
sub-sample. This nding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an ecient
response by donors when losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid.
When aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less
prevalent. Aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries, consistent with the OECD
Development Assistance Committee's recommendation to its members.
Keywords: aid, development assistance, collective action, corruption
1. Introduction
A consensus in the international aid community holds that tying aid to purchases from
the donor country reduces its eectiveness. More recently a consensus has also emerged
on the importance of reducing aid fragmentation and the transactions costs it imposes on
recipient countries. This study explores possible trade-os and complementarities between
these two objectives. We test two opposing hypotheses about the relationship between
aid fragmentation and aid tying. Some observers caution that reducing aid fragmentation
can reduce the bargaining power of a recipient country government relative to that of its
remaining donors. If reducing the number of donors implies they have more monopoly
Corresponding author
Email addresses: sknack@worldbank.org (Stephen Knack), lodewijk.smets@ua.ac.be (Lodewijk
Smets)power, donors may exploit this increased power by tying more of their aid to purchases
from contractors based in their own countries.1 An opposing view stresses the benets
from concentrating aid among fewer donors: responsibility for development outcomes is less
diused, and donors are less likely to indulge in practices that undermine aid's eectiveness.
A donor with a larger share of the aid market in a country has a stronger incentive to
maximize the development impact of its aid instead of pursuing commercial or other non-
development objectives. Thus, more concentrated aid should be associated with less tying
of aid.
Our empirical tests strongly and consistently support the second of these two argu-
ments. Untying aid and reducing fragmentation turn out to be complementary rather than
con
icting objectives. Higher donor aid shares, and lower values on fragmentation indexes,
are associated with lower rates of aid tying. These ndings are robust to recipient controls,
donor xed eects, and to instrumental variables estimation.
When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes,
donors with higher aid shares are found to tie signicantly less aid only in the less-corrupt
sub-sample. This nding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an ecient
response by donors where losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid.
Where aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is
less prevalent. Furthermore, we nd aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries,
consistent with the OECD-DAC's recommendation to its members on aid tying.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature on aid tying and on donor fragmentation, from aid scholars and aid organizations
(most notably the OECD-DAC). In section 3 we present a simple model of donor behavior,
similar to common pool resource models of voluntary collective action, that predicts larger
aid shares (and lower fragmentation index values) will be associated with less aid tying.
The model also generates the trivial but testable prediction that aid tying will be inversely
related to its costs. A straightforward extension of the model generate the prediction that
donor aid shares will be more weakly (or even positively) related to aid tying if corruption is
a suciently severe problem in recipient governments. The data are described and empirical
ndings presented in section 4, including results from both OLS and IV estimation and
various robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
There is little agreement on aid's development impact, and on how to improve its eec-
tiveness. Although empirical evidence remains relatively scarce, a consensus has emerged
in the development aid community regarding certain donor behaviors, as re
ected in the
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Eectiveness. Among other actions, this agreement urges
donors to reduce aid fragmentation and to untie more of their aid. The practice of tying aid
1Donors could exercise any monopoly power in other ways, such as imposing extraneous conditionality,
or investing less eort in designing good projects or in a policy dialogue. We focus on aid tying to the
exclusion of other practices because there are reasonably comprehensive data available for most donors.
2{ providing it conditional on using it to purchase goods and services from suppliers based
in the donor country { has been estimated to increase costs by 5% to 30%, or even more
for food (Jepma, 1991; Aryeetey et al., 2003; Clay et al., 2009). The OECD's Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) therefore issued a recommendation to its members in
2001 to untie aid to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the largest extent possible,
but exempting food aid, technical assistance, and aid channeled through NGOs instead
of recipient governments2. Aid untying is monitored under the Millennium Development
Goals, as one of many indicators under the 8th goal of developing a global partnership for
development. Tying aid not only reduces its value to the recipient, but is considered to
be inconsistent with the Paris Declaration principles of country ownership and alignment
with country priorities and systems. The share of aid that is untied is thus included as
one of the 12 Paris Declaration Indicators for improved aid eectiveness (OECD, 2011).
Untied aid as a share of total aid from the DAC donors increased from roughly 55% before
the recommendation was issued to 80% or more in recent years. Donors vary with respect
to how much of their aid is untied, for aid that is covered by the recommendation and for
exempted categories. Moreover, a given donor may vary with respect to how much of its
aid is tied in dierent recipient countries. A donor's share of the aid market in each of its
recipients is one possible determinant of the extent of its aid tying.
There is a potential trade-o between untying aid and another objective in the Paris
Declaration, namely reducing aid fragmentation. Recipient countries are faced with an
increasing number of donors engaged in delivering development assistance. For instance,
in 1960 a developing country received aid from less than two donors on average, while in
2006 the average number of donors per recipient had risen to more than twenty eight (Frot
and Santiso, 2008). Several studies, including Acharya et al. (2006) and World Bank (2003,
Ch. 7) argue that this proliferation of donors imposes high transaction costs on recipient
governments, thereby reducing the value of aid. Anderson (2011) shows that fragmenting a
donor's aid across many recipients is associated with higher reported administrative costs
by the donor. Knack and Rahman (2007) show that where aid is more fragmented among
donors, the quality of government bureaucracy in the recipient country deteriorates more.
They argue that when donors each have only a small share of the aid market, they tend to
focus more narrowly on delivering successful projects, even at the risk of undermining gov-
ernment capacity by hiring away the most talented public managers. Kimura et al. (2007)
claim that donor proliferation hinders economic growth, and Djankov et al. (2009) rene
this argument, presenting evidence that donor fragmentation reduces economic growth in
part through increased corruption.
Concerns over the transactions costs incurred by recipients in dealing with so many
donors are re
ected in the donor harmonization provisions of the Paris Declaration. Sev-
eral harmonization indicators, with specic targets, are included in the Paris Declaration
Monitoring framework (OECD, 2011), although these do not call specically for donors to
concentrate their aid on fewer countries. The Accra Agenda for Action, issued at the Third
High Level Forum on Aid Eectiveness in September 2008, asserts that the \eectiveness
2Eective in 2009 the recommendation was extended to cover non-LDC HIPC countries.
3of aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially at country
and sector levels." It commits a broad range of aid providers to \reduce the fragmenta-
tion of aid by improving the complementarity of donors' eorts and the division of labor
among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within
countries, and across countries." OECD (2009) suggests that donors re-allocate some of
their aid from \non-signicant" to \signicant" relationships (those where aid is relatively
small from both the donor's and recipient's standpoints).
Some observers, however, warn about harmful eects on recipients from excessive donor
harmonization. Rogerson (2005) and Frot and Santiso (2009) note that a low Herndahl
index is interpreted as an indicator of healthy competition among rms in the economics
of industrial organization literature, and argue that high aid fragmentation (measured by
one minus the Herndahl index) may similarly re
ect more competition among donors, to
the benet of recipients. The DAC itself (OECD, 2011, Ch. 4) in describing the costs of
fragmentation also acknowledges that a recipient may benet from having a diversied set
of funding sources and from working with numerous donor agencies with dierent areas of
expertise. \In addition to the policy autonomy that might be forfeited" from dependence
on one key donor, "the recipient would also likely face a riskier ODA environment" if
subject to the foreign policy whims and changes in economic circumstances of a single
large bilateral donor (Rowlands and Ketcheson, 2002). A donor agency evaluation found
that government ocials in some countries (including Benin and Malawi) favored a single
assistance strategy guiding all donors' activities in their countries, but other governments
were not interested, \as they preferred to have options, which would be undermined if
donors coordinated on a joint strategy" (IEG, 2011). In general, therefore, benets to the
recipient from this competition, diversity of ideas and more consistent 
ow of total funds
should be balanced against the higher transactions costs of fragmentation (Rogerson, 2005).
Gibson et al. (2005) and Frot and Santiso (2009) assert more specically that donors with
monopoly power in a country may exploit it by tying more of their aid. If so, progress
toward an improved division of labor among donors could slow progress on untying aid.
While the monopoly argument implies that aid fragmentation should reduce the inci-
dence of aid tying, other views of donor-recipient interactions imply there should be no
relationship. Easterly (2002) agrees that aid fragmentation imposes more transactions
costs on recipients, but believes it does not materially aect the balance of power between
a recipient and donor. Donors in a recipient country act as a de facto cartel, in Easterly's
view, whether they are few or numerous. Munro (2005) is skeptical of claims regarding the
benets of concentrating a donor's aid on fewer countries and sectors, noting a dearth of
systematic empirical evidence, but he is also skeptical that a typical donor can increase its
leverage with a recipient government by increasing its share of the aid market in the coun-
try. This view of limited donor in
uence contrasts starkly to Easterly's, but both views
suggest that a donor's ability to impose its will on a recipient government is unrelated to
its share of the aid market in the country. Finally, aid markets may be highly contestable
even in countries where we observe few donors operating in equilibrium. Recipients have
been known to accept aid from certain donors while rejecting it from others they nd less
compatible for one reason or another. In empirical tests of the link between fragmentation
4and aid tying, therefore, a failure to reject the null could mean either (1) available measures
of fragmentation are poor measures of monopoly power, or (2) donors do not exploit their
monopoly power to tie more of their aid, or both.
These arguments all have some merit but arguably neglect more powerful incentives
shaping donor behavior emphasized in Acharya et al. (2006) and Knack and Rahman
(2007). Analyzing donor incentives from a collective action theory (Olson, 1965, 1982;
Hardin, 1982) perspective, Knack and Rahman (2007) argue that higher aid shares give
donors a more \encompassing interest" (Olson, 1982) in a country's development. Where
numerous donors operate and each provides only a small part of development assistance,
responsibility for development outcomes is diused. "The more donors there are, the
easier it is to assume or assert that the lack of development progress is someone else's fault"
(Acharya et al., 2006). Any single donor has little reputational stake in the success or failure
of the recipient's development program. This collective action problem is exacerbated if
donors { as generally acknowledged in the literature { have multiple objectives. Bilateral
aid programs are not designed solely to pursue development objectives (public goods) but
also to pursue commercial, security or other objectives (\private" goods, in the sense that
they have no value to the recipient or to other donors). As illustrated by a simple model
below, donors may trade o these objectives dierently, and a given donor might make
dierent trade-os in dierent countries.
3. A Simple Formalization
Assume there are n  1 donors present in a recipient country. Donors' total utility
from the development benets of each unit of untied aid and tied aid are, respectively, Y
and Y  c, where c represents the costs (i.e. reduction in development benets) of a donor's
decision to tie aid. We consider the benets of development as a rival but non-excludable
public good for which each donor gets credit, in terms of agency or national prestige, in
proportion to the share of aid it contributes. Each donor also receives a private benet X
from each unit of tied aid it provides, and zero benets from each unit of tied aid other
donors provide. We assume that X < c < Y , so aid tying is always inecient. Donor i's




aj;T(Y   cj) +
n X
j=1
(aj   aj;T)Y ) + ai;TX (3.1)
where ai;T is the amount of tied aid donor i provides, Si = ai=
Pn
j=1 aj represents the share
of aid in the country provided by donor i, aj;T is the amount of tied aid donor j disburses,
and aj is the total aid donor j contributes.
Proposition 1. If i is the only donor present in the recipient country, the ecient devel-
opment outcome is obtained as no aid is tied.
Proof. When a single donor provides all of the aid in the recipient country, its utility
function reduces to:
uM(aM;T) = aM;T(Y   cM) + aM   aM;T)Y + aM;TX (3.2)
5The monopoly donor will tie aid if and only if X   c > Y , but by assumption X < Y . It
follows that no development losses are incurred due to aid tying.
Proposition 2. In the general case where multiple donors are present in the recipient
country, aid tying will be inversely related to the donor's aid share and tying costs (i.e.
development losses from tying aid).
Proof. When a donor has only part of the aid market, equation 3.1 can be rewritten as
ui(ai;T) = Bi + ai;TX   Siai;Tci





j6=i(aj  aj;T)Y )+SiY ai. Consequently, donor i will untie its aid if and only if
X < Sici (3.3)
Equivalently, a donor will tie its aid if and only if its benets from doing so, X, exceed
its share of the development losses, Sic. Thus, donors with higher tying costs and higher
aid shares are less likely to tie their aid 3. In deciding whether to tie aid, donor i weighs its
share of the costs of aid tying in forgone development benets against its \private" benets
from aid tying. When it is the only donor it fully internalizes the costs, which exceed its
benets. More generally, it internalizes only Si of the cost and other donors collectively
bear 1   Si of the costs associated with donor i's tying of aid in the country.
To this point we have maintained the assumption that aid tying is inecient from
the perspective of producing development benets. This assumption re
ects the DAC's
position that tying aid increases costs, and benets only special interests in donor countries.
Reality is likely more complex. First, for small contracts the added search costs of a
fully competitive procurement process may sometimes exceed any potential cost savings.
Second, tying aid may strengthen political support for larger aid budgets in some donor
countries, and the additional aid 
ows may fully compensate for the cost ineciencies
associated with tying aid. There is little if any data or evidence bearing on these two
arguments. However, a third argument on ecient aid tying is more empirically tractable.
Amegashie et al. (2007) raise the possibility that tying aid could prevent it from being
embezzled by public ocials. The implication is that where corruption is suciently severe,
the development benets from tied aid could exceed those from untied aid. Then, the losses
of tying aid must be balanced against losses from graft. We thus relax the assumption that
aid tying is necessarily inecient, and extend the model to incorporate corruption.
3In the model a donor either ties none or all of its aid in each country it assists. In reality, donors in
many countries tie more than 0% but less than 100% of their aid. The model can be readily generalized
from the discrete choice case to the continuous case, to predict that the proportion of aid a donor disburses
that it chooses to tie, ai;T=ai, will be lower for donors with high aid shares.
6Proposition 3. When recipients dier with respect to the incidence of graft, donors are
more likely to tie their aid in countries where losses from graft for untied aid are greater.
Proof. Where there are potential losses in development benets of aid from graft, the
donor's benets from a unit of tied aid are still X + Y   ciSi, but now the benets of
untied aid are Y   gSi instead of Y . Donors tie aid if
X > Si(ci   g) (3.4)
Where g > ci, tying is ecient: net development losses are reduced when aid is tied
to prevent aid from being embezzled. Empirically, we cannot determine how prevalent
is this case, but we have no reason to question the implicit assumption in the DAC's
untying campaign that it is relatively rare 4. For a subset of the most graft-ridden recipient
countries, however, it is plausible that g could rival ci in magnitude. Note that in the case
where tying is ecient, i.e. g > ci, tying is more likely when Si is higher. Our indicators
of tying costs and corruption are too crude to identify these cases in the data to test this
hypothesis directly. However, we can test the prediction that in a subset of the more
corrupt countries, the negative relationship between aid share and tying will be weaker
in magnitude, and possibly even reversed in sign. Alternatively, the negative relationship
between aid shares and aid tying may strengthen when the most corrupt recipient countries
are dropped from the sample.
In another variation of the model, we assume that credit (or blame) for development
outcomes is equally shared among all active donors in the recipient country, rather than
in proportion to aid shares. While this assumption regarding donor motivation seems less
plausible in general, some stylized facts appear to support it. One reason (among others)
as to why small donors fragment their aid across many recipients may be the credit they
receive out of proportion to their aid shares when they have at least a minimal presence
in the country. The tendency of aid to 
ow to well-performing countries remarked on by
some observers (Cassen, 1986) is also consistent with this assumption 5. In this variant of







aj;T(Y   c) +
n X
j=1
(aj   aj;T)Y ) + ai;TX (3.5)
with n the number of donors present in the recipient country. This setup generates similar
predictions: in the general case where multiple donors are active, a donor will untie its aid
4Even if there are sizeable losses of aid to corruption, what is at issue here is only the losses that can
be averted by tying aid.
5Vietnam is a recent example. Its remarkable success in economic growth and poverty reduction since
the Doi Moi did not go unnoticed by aid donors. While Japan traditionally has had the largest aid share
in Vietnam among bilateral donors, many others have been drawn to the country, most with marginal aid
shares.





According to equation 3.6 aid tying is more likely to occur in recipient countries with many




j=1 aj, for those countries. In the
next section we empirically test the predictions of the basic model and these two variations.
4. Empirical Testing
Comparative statics of section 3 show that aid tying is inversely related to the donor's
share of aid in a country, and that aid tying is more likely to occur in recipient countries
with many donors. Below we rst describe the models and data used for testing these pre-
dictions, and in subsection 4.2 we present our empirical ndings, including some robustness
tests.
4.1. Models and Data
The key predictions in section 3 concern the aid share of each donor in recipient coun-
tries (eq. 3.1) and the number of donors active in each recipient (eq. 3.5). We use a
cross-sectional panel of donor-recipient observations to test the prediction from equation
3.3 that aid tying will be negatively correlated with aid share. Specically, we estimate
the following model:
ij = #0 + #1Sij + #2LDCi + #Zi + j + ij (4.1)
where ij is the share of aid donor j disburses to recipient i that is tied, Sij is donor
j's share in the total amount of aid recipient i receives, and LDCi is a dummy variable
indicating whether the recipient country is classied as a Least Developed Country. Zi is
a vector of recipient-specic control variables. The j are donor xed eects and ij is a
well-behaved error term.
In accordance with our formalization we expect a negative sign for #1. The coecient
for #2 should also be negative, if donors are complying with the 2001 DAC recommendation
to untie aid to LDCs (see OECD, 2008). Zi includes the logs of population, GDP per capita,
and total aid, and total aid as a share of GNI. The DAC's focus on LDCs in its aid untying
campaign is premised on their heavier reliance on ODA (OECD, 2008, p. 4). Although
the recommendation applies formally to LDCs, other indicators of aid dependence could be
linked to the prevalence of aid untying. Smaller countries tend to receive less aid, and other
things equal generally have less access to private capital markets. Countries with higher
per capita incomes (holding country size constant) are less aid dependent. The coecients
on population and per capita income in aid tying regressions are therefore expected to be
positive. Actual aid volume, controlling for population, and aid share of GNI, are more
direct measures of aid dependence. Both of their coecients are expected to be negative.
The donor xed eects will control for any general tendency for some donors to tie more of
their aid, regardless of the countries they are aiding. For example, some donors may tend
8to place a lower weight on development objectives, relative to other donors, and a higher
weight on \private" objectives related to commercial interests.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in table 1 for the main sample of
1959 observations for the year 2007. Standard errors were adjusted for donor clustering of
observations. Note that all observations where the donor is a multilateral aid agency are
excluded from the sample, because they exhibit no variation in the dependent variable.
All but the EC have no tied aid, and all of its aid is classied as partially tied6. Several
small non-DAC donors are also dropped from the analysis, because they do not report aid
tying status. The sample of donors thus includes 22 DAC members (all but the EC). All
recipients of aid in the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) are included, with the
exception of a small number of countries that were already classied as high income by the
World Bank.
Although our aid share measure varies across donors within each recipient, the number
of donors does not. We therefore test the model's prediction that more donors will be
associated with higher tied aid using a cross section of 133 recipient countries for 2007.
Specically, we estimate the following equation:
i = 0 + 1Ni + 2LDCi + Xi + "i (4.2)
where i represents the share of aid recipient i receives that is tied, Ni is the number of
donors present in recipient country i, LDCi is a dummy indicating whether the recipient
country is classied as a Least Developed Country, and Xi is a vector of recipient-specic
controls. Summary statistics of these variables are found in table 2. Standard errors robust
to possible heteroskedasticity are reported in all tests.
Data on aid tying shares were computed from the AidData portal, a database which
provides development nancing data at the project level7. AidData uses the CRS as a
main source. The CRS reports for each project the total commitment amount, the amount
of tied aid, the amount of partially tied aid and the amount of untied aid. Tied aid is
dened as development assistance where procurement of goods and services is limited to
the donor country or to a group of countries which do not include substantially all aid
recipient countries. For aid to be classied as partially tied the latter must be the case,
i.e. the group of eligible countries must include substantially all recipients. Finally, untied
aid is dened as development assistance for which the associated goods and services may
be fully and freely procured in all countries (DAC, 2001)8. Based on these denitions
6The EC is in some respects more like a bilateral than a multilateral donor. For example, Martens et al.
(2002, p. 192) report that \national representatives in EC foreign aid decision-making committees spend
a considerable part of their time exploring and pursuing contract opportunities for national suppliers".
Unlike multilateral donors, it is a member of the OECD DAC.
7See www.aiddata.org
8Although these data are the best available, they do not tell the full story on aid tying. Some aid that
technically meets the untied criteria may be de facto tied (Clay et al., 2009). Many donors with a high
rate of untied aid (including some small donor countries) nevertheless award a high share of aid contracts
within the home country. Furthermore, some donors do not comply adequately with the transparency
provisions of the 2001 DAC recommendation that call for ex ante notication to the DAC of aid contracts
open for bidding and ex ante reporting on contracts awarded.
9we constructed and tested three alternative measures of tied aid share in estimating both
models:
1. the sum of tied and partially tied aid divided by the sum of tied, partially tied and
untied aid;
2. the amount of tied aid divided by the sum of tied, partially tied and untied aid;
3. the sum of tied, partially tied, and aid for which tying status was unreported, divided
by the total commitment amount9.
Several independent variables were also taken from the AidData portal, including the
number of donors present in a recipient country, and each donor's share of the aid given
to each recipient. Total aid as a share of recipient GNI, population and GDP per capita
were obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The LDC dummy
is constructed based on the denition in the 2001 DAC recommendation (DAC, 2001).
4.2. Empirical Findings
Results for model 4.1 are presented in table 3, for each of the three alternative denitions
of tied aid. Consistent with the model's predictions, coecients for a donor's share in the
total amount of aid are signicantly negative. Using either denition 1 or 2, each percentage
point increase in a donor's share in total aid is associated with a reduction of 0.4 percentage
points in the share of tied aid. To illustrate, an increase in aid share from the mean value
of 3% to 8% other things equal would be associated with a decline in tied aid from the
mean of about 20% to 18%. For denition 3, the coecient on aid share is somewhat larger
(in absolute value).
The LDC coecient is also signicantly negative, consistent with the DAC recommen-
dation on aid untying. Other things equal, the share of tied aid is 7 percentage points
lower in LDCs, or 10 percentage points based on results in equation 3. Tied aid tends to
be higher in larger countries: the coecient on log of population is positive and marginally
signicant in equations 1 and 2. Tied aid is signicantly lower where aid volumes are
higher. These results are consistent with the spirit of the DAC recommendation on aid
untying, namely that it is particularly important to maximize the value of aid by untying
it in countries more dependent on aid. However, aid/GNI is not signicant, and income
per capita is signicant (with the expected positive coecient) only in equation 3.
The DAC's reports on aid tying focus on denition 1. This is also the aid untying
indicator included in the Paris Declaration monitoring framework. In describing robustness
of our results on aid share to changes in specication or sample, we therefore also use
denition 1, where space constraints lead us to select only one of the three indicators.
First, we consider the possibility of in
uential observations. Figure 1 depicts the partial
relationship between tied aid and aid share, based on equation 1. Visual examination
9Nine donor countries did not report the tying status of some of their aid in 2007. In denition 3, we
follow Easterly (2002) in treating aid with unreported tying status as tied. Such aid is disproportionately
technical assistance, which is more often tied than other aid categories (DAC, 2001). Denition 3 therefore
overestimates tied aid, but denitions 1 and 2 underestimate it, for the nine donors in question.
10suggests that a handful of high values on aid share could be in
uential in producing its
negative and signicant coecient. Accordingly, in equation 4 we re-run equation 1, but
dropping the 29 observations in which a donor's aid share exceeds one-third. The aid share
coecient remains negative and signicant, and even increases in magnitude.
The majority of aid share values in the data are under 1%. Arguably donors have no
leverage in these cases (Munro, 2005), or if they do, there is no real increase in leverage
from providing (say) 0.8% instead of 0.2%. We therefore checked to ensure that our results
were not sensitive to the possibly spurious variation among these small values. Specically,
we tested an alternative aid share variable in which all values greater than 0% but under
1% were set equal to 1%. Results are shown in equation 5. The coecient and signicance
of the aid share variable are aected only trivially, compared to the base specication of
equation 1.
The majority of tied aid values in the panel data are equal to one of the extreme points,
0 or 1. We are unable to use a tobit estimator, because xed-eects tobit estimates are
biased. The value added of tobit estimation is relatively small in any case, according to
Angrist and Pischke (2009). However, we report results in equation 6 for the smaller sample
of values strictly between 0 and 1. Aid share remains highly signicant in this limited set
of observations.
Amegashie et al. (2007) raise the possibility that the costs of tying aid must be balanced
against losses from graft when aid is untied. Where corruption levels are high, tying aid
does not necessarily reduces its development benets. A testable implication is that the
negative relationship between aid shares and aid tying should strengthen when the most
corrupt recipient countries are dropped from the sample. Accordingly, in equation 1 of
table 4 we retain only the less corrupt 50% of observations, namely those scoring above
the median value on the \Control of Corruption" variable from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators project (higher scores indicate lower perceived corruption). The aid share coef-
cient increases in absolute value from -.4 (from the base specication of table 3, equation
1) to -.53 (in equation 5) and remains highly signicant. 10 For the more corrupt half of
the sample (equation 2), the aid share coecient remains negative, but drops to -.25 and is
not signicantly dierent from zero 11. This result is consistent with the view that theory
is ambiguous regarding the eect of aid share on aid tying when losses from aid tying must
be balanced against losses from embezzling aid funds where corruption is high.
In equation 3, we return to using the full sample but add Control of Corruption as a
regressor. Where recipient-country procurement systems are believed to be more corrupt,
donors are more likely to bypass them and use their own rules and procedures, including aid
tying. This reasoning implies the coecient on Control of Corruption should be negative.
It turns out to be positive, but very small and not signicant. Results for the key aid
10Dividing the sample by the median value of the corruption perceptions indicator is arbitrary, but
results are very similar if many alternative cutpoints are used. Even if we retain only the least corrupt
30% of observations, aid share remains signicant at the .04 level with a coecient of -0.6.
11The .34 dierence between these two coecients is not statistically signicant at conventional levels,
however.
11share variable are unaected. Similar results are obtained if we instead use the well-known
Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International. However, corruption is
associated with higher rates of aid tying in cross-sectional tests reported below.
There are potentially many more recipient-country characteristics, other than those
explicitly controlled for thus far, that could aect the level of aid tying. The most eective
way to correct for any omitted-variables bias in our results for the key aid share variable
is simply to replace the recipient-country variables with a full set of recipient country
dummies. Equation 4 reports results from this two-way xed eects regression. The
coecient on aid share declines slightly, from about -0.4 to -0.37, but statistical signicance
is slightly strengthened.
In equations 5 and 6 we report tests of the eects of costs of aid tying for donors, using
donor size and income as rough proxies for costs. The value of aid in general should be
reduced by more when it is tied to purchases in smaller donor countries, because the pool
of qualied rms or consultants is likely to be smaller. Consultant fees (and thus tying
costs) are likely to be higher in higher-income donor countries 12. In equation 5, tying
costs are measured by the log of population and log of per capita income in current US
dollars (both for 2006). In equation 6 we substitute for population the log of total aid,
measured in constant US dollars and averaged over the years 1995-2006. The rationale
for this proxy is that the number of rms and consultants residing in the country with
expertise pertinent to development assistance increases (but at a diminishing rate) with
past and present aid expenditures. To test these donor-level variables we have to drop the
donor xed eects, and we instead use recipient xed eects, and correct standard errors
for recipient-clustered rather than donor-clustered observations. Aid tying is positively
and signicantly related to both donor size measures, as expected, in equations 5 and 6.
Income, as predicted, is inversely (and signicantly) related to the incidence of aid tying
in both tests. We cannot rule out the possibility that smaller and wealthier donors tie
less of their aid for other reasons, but the relationships are consistent with our theoretical
framework. Donor aid share remains highly signicant in both tests.
4.3. Endogeneity of Aid Share
Regressions in tables 3 and 4 treat aid share as exogenous. It is conceivable { but
unlikely in our view { that the negative coecient on aid share re
ects endogeneity bias.
Suppose recipients discourage aid from donors that tie more of their aid, and lobby for
more aid from other donors. Then, higher tied aid would be associated with lower aid
shares, due to reverse causation. However, most recipients appear to accept whatever aid
they are oered, and when they can be selective regarding aid oers they may care more
about conditionality, sector, modality, and other issues than about tying status. Moreover,
aid shares are probably determined much more by donor than by recipient decisions. If so,
any reverse causation would likely produce a positive bias. For example, a donor agency
(under pressure from lobby groups or parliament) may increase aid to recipients where it
12Admittedly, the quality of consultants may also tend to be somewhat higher in higher-income countries.
12is easier to tie aid. Nevertheless we attempt to correct for any possible endogeneity bias
empirically using instrumental variables estimation.
In table 5 we treat aid share as endogenous in estimating its eects on tied aid using
2SLS. Exogenous instruments for aid share include (1) geographic distance between the
capital cities of the donor and recipients, (2) a dummy for whether or not the recipient
is a former colony of the donor country, and (3) share of aid from multilateral donors,
including the EC. Data on distance were obtained for 1946 observations from Gleditsch
(2011), and supplemented with our own research for 13 other observations belonging to
Tonga and Kiribati. The colonial ties variable was the product of our own research, and is
dened with respect to the nal colonial power for recipients where there was more than
one. Data on multilateral aid shares are from AidData.
Colonial ties have been shown in various studies to be associated with higher aid from
a donor (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Donors also tend to focus more of their aid on
countries within their geographic region, for example Japan and Australia in the East
Asia and Pacic region. This likely re
ects enhanced geo-political interests, as well as
lower costs in providing aid (such as shorter 
ights for donor missions). Colonial ties and
distance vary across observations both by donors and by recipients. The third instrument,
share of aid from multilaterals, is a recipient-level variable. In recipients with higher shares
of multilateral aid, aid shares for each bilateral donors should be lower (unless there are
fewer of them present). The share of aid from multilaterals should have no direct eect on
tying status of bilateral aid, although we cannot rule out the possibility that the decisions of
some bilaterals may be in
uenced one way or the other by greater multilateral involvement
in a country. For colonial ties and geographic distance, it is conceivable they could aect
aid tying directly. If donors have more of a stake in development outcomes in recipients
that are ex-colonies or geographically closer, they might not only provide more aid to
them but also provide it in ways that make it more productive. However, our instruments
easily pass the relevant tests of over-identication in our 2SLS tests, reported in table 5.
Depending on which of the three alternative tied aid measures are used, p values for the
Hansen's J test statistic range from .29 to .38, so the null hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are correctly excluded cannot be rejected.
Equation 1 in table 5 reports the rst stage regression for our 2SLS tests.13 As in
tables 3 and 4, standard errors are adjusted for donor-clustered observations. Distance,
colonial ties, and multilateral aid share are all signicant at the .01 level. Coecients for
distance and multilateral share are negative as expected, and positive for colonial ties as
expected. An F test conrms the strength of these excluded instruments: the F statistic
is 6.7, signicant at the .0024 level.
Equation 2 reports the second-stage results for tied aid, based on denition 1. The
aid share coecient is negative as in the OLS regressions, and is somewhat larger in
absolute value. It is signicant only at the .10 level however. Results for other variables,
including the LDC dummy, are very similar to their OLS counterparts. Equation 3 reports
second-stage results for tied aid based on denition 2 (i.e. treating partially tied aid as
13Estimations were performed using STATA's XTIVREG2 procedure.
13untied). Results on aid share are similar to those in equation 2, but with a slightly larger
coecient (-.5 compared to -.47) and test statistic (-1.88 compared to -1.73). Equation 4
is based on denition 3, which treats aid with its tying status unreported as being tied.
Aid share is signicant at the .05 level, with a coecient slightly larger in absolute value
(-.61 compared to -.57) than in the corresponding OLS regression in table 3. The key
nding that donors with higher aid shares tie less of their aid is thus robust to correcting
for potential endogeneity of aid shares.
4.4. Cross Sectional Tests
The results of model 4.2, tested for a cross-section of recipient countries, are also mostly
in accordance with our theoretical predictions (see table 6). The key variable is now the
number of donors, instead of a donor's share of aid, so the expected coecient sign is now
positive instead of negative. Equation 1 of table 6 reports results for denition 1 of the
dependent variable. A larger number of donors is associated with a higher tied aid share;
this positive relationship is signicant at the .01 level. Each additional donor is associated
with an increase of 1.3 percentage points in the total share of the recipient country's aid
that is tied. The LDC dummy is negative and signicant at the .10 level: other things
equal, the tied aid share in LDCs is 10 percentage points lower than in other aid recipient
countries. Control variables are not signicant in equation 1. Equation 2 substitutes
denition 2 of tied aid. The coecient on number of donors is again positive and (even
more) highly signicant. The control variables are also signicant in this regression, mostly
with the same coecient signs as in the panel data tests. Equation 3 shows that the positive
and signicant result for number of donors is also robust to using denition 3 of tied aid,
although it is the only signicant regressor in this test.
Equations 4 and 5 replicate equations 1 and 2, but adding two more regressors, the
EC's aid share and the share of other multilateral aid. In the panel data analysis, tied aid
was measured for each bilateral donor-recipient pair, so there was no reason to expect any
direct eect of multilateral aid shares. In table 6, tied aid is aggregated over all donors
for each recipient. The fact that EC aid is partially tied and other multilateral aid untied
should thus have a direct eect on the share of tied aid in these cross-sectional tests14.
The predicted sign for the EC aid share depends on whether or not partially tied aid is
dened as tied. In equation 4, based on denition 1, we observe the expected positive (and
signicant) coecient on EC aid share. Each percentage point increase in the EC aid share
increases the tied aid share by slightly more than 1 percentage point. In equation 5, based
on denition 2, we observe the expected negative (and signicant) coecient on EC aid
share. The expected negative coecient on share of aid from other multilateral donors is
not observed, however, in either equation 4 or 5. This nding suggests that bilateral donors
may tie (or partially tie) a larger share of their aid when multilaterals (other than the EC)
14Multilateral aid is thus not a valid instrument for aid share in the cross sectional tests. Moreover,
the other instruments used in the 2SLS panel data tests, colonial tie and distance, are dened only with
respect to donor-recipient pairs, and we were unable to identify any other good instruments for 2SLS tests
using cross sectional data.
14are present in force. Inclusion of these two regressors further strengthens the signicance
of the number of donors in equation 4 (relative to equation 1) and leaves it unaected in
equation 5 (relative to equation 2).
Additional robustness tests are reported for the cross-sectional analysis in table 7, based
on denition 1 of tied aid. In equation 1, we add the Control of Corruption indicator.
Although it was insignicant in the panel data tests in table 3, it exhibits the expected
negative and signicant eects on tied aid in this cross sectional regression. Higher values
{ meaning lower perceived government corruption { are associated with lower rates of aid
tying by donors, as expected15. Results on the number of donors variable are not aected
by the inclusion of the corruption indicator.
As in the panel data tests, tied aid is more sensitive to the market structure of aid
when more highly corrupt countries are excluded from the sample. When the sample is
split by the median value of Control of Corruption, the coecient on number of donors is
.015 (signicant at .001) for the less corrupt sub-sample, and .009 (signicant at .05) for
the more corrupt sub-sample16. Again, these ndings are consistent with our theoretical
framework: where aid tying is less inecient (or possibly even ecient), the strength-
ened incentives of donors in less-fragmented aid environments to act eciently has more
ambiguous implications for aid tying.
Some empirical studies of aid fragmentation omit donors that provide only very small
amounts of aid, often representing non-project technical cooperation, such as scholarships
or small grants channeled through NGOs. The rationale in omitting these \micro-aid"
relationships is that they do not typically entail signicant transactions costs for recipient
governments. The presence of these small donors may similarly not add in any meaningful
way to the competitiveness of the aid market in the country. Providing scholarships or
micro-grants to NGOs does not necessarily indicate a willingness to provide larger amounts
of aid to governments, so recipients may not be able to use them as leverage in negotiating
with their other donors. In equation 2, therefore, we follow OECD (2009) in counting as
donors only those providing more than $ 250,000 in aid to the country. This change in
denition reduces the average number of donors per country in the sample from 26 to 20.
The coecient on number of donors in equation 2 remains positive and highly signicant,
however.
Remaining regressions in table 7 go beyond model 4.2, replacing the number of donors
with an aid fragmentation index, and exploring the possibility of a nonlinear relation
between number of donors and the share of tied aid. Equation 3 replaces the number
of donors with an index of donor fragmentation, equal to one minus the sum of squared
shares of each donor's aid in the country. This index has been used in studies of aid
fragmentation (e.g. Knack and Rahman, 2007), and is based on the Herndahl index of
15Amegashie et al. (2007) nd an insignicant relationship between aid tying by bilateral donors and the
quality of governance in recipient countries. Although their theoretical exposition emphasizes corruption,
they measure quality of governance empirically with the Freedom House indicators of civil liberties and
political freedoms.
16Results not reported in tables for space reasons but available on request.
15market concentration, a standard measure of monopoly power in the industrial organization
literature. Its coecient in equation 3 is positive and highly signicant: tying of aid is
more likely where aid is more fragmented across donors. As with the results above on
aid shares and on the number of donors, this result is consistent with the argument that
donors give lower weight to development objectives and higher weight to commercial or
other donor-specic objectives of their aid programs when responsibility is more diused.
We tested for nonlinear relationships with tied aid in the panel data (for aid shares)
and in the cross sectional data (for number of donors and fragmentation indexes). One
possibility is that tied aid increases monotonically with (say) number of donors, but at
a diminishing rate. However, taking the log of number of donors (or aid shares, in the
panel data) does not improve the empirical t. Another possibility is that the relation is
quadratic. For aid share in the panel data, the quadratic specication was not signicant,
and we conclude that the negative relationship between aid share and tied aid is at least
roughly linear17. Quadratic relationships turn out to be signicant in the cross-sectional
data, however. In equation 4, the number of donors and its square are both highly sig-
nicant, with tied aid rst increasing but eventually declining as the number of donors
increases beyond 30. The explanatory power of the model (R square = .78) improves rel-
ative to its linear counterpart in equation 4 of table 6 (R square = .72). This quadratic
relation is robust to excluding the micro-donors from the count of number of donors, as
shown in equation 5 of table 7. The tied aid share rst increases with the number of
(non-micro) donors, but above 26 it decreases.
These curvilinear relationships are not driven by a small number of extreme values:
there are dozens of countries in the sample with more than 30 donors. However, it seems
doubtful that the decline in (predicted values of) tied aid as the number of donors increases
from, say, 30 to 35, has anything to do with a more competitive aid market that gives
recipients more leverage in negotiating with donors. It is more plausible that an increase
from, say, 5 to 10 donors might increase competition, but that increase is associated with
a predicted rise in the share of aid that is tied. The quadratic relationship is not predicted
by our model, but nor is it predicted by the argument that concentrating aid in a country
among fewer donors comes at the expense of giving them more market power.
Equation 6 in table 7 reports a signicant quadratic relationship for the fragmentation
index. In this case, the improvement in explanatory power is marginal (R square = .73,
compared to .72 in equation 3). Moreover, the predicted maximum for tied aid is at a
fragmentation index value of .98, while all of the actual values in the sample are .92 or
below. For all 133 countries in the sample, therefore, the tied aid share is predicted to
increase with fragmentation - the opposite of what we would observe if more fragmentation
implies less market power for donors in a country.
17These results are not reported in tables for space reasons but are available on request.
165. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we tested two opposing hypotheses regarding the eect of aid fragmenta-
tion on aid tying. Results oer no support for the hypothesis that more concentrated aid
confers monopoly power on donors that they exploit by tying more of their aid. Instead, we
nd strong evidence that lower fragmentation is associated with less aid tying. This result
is predicted by a model of donor behavior adapted from Knack and Rahman (2007) and
based on collective action theory. In countries where aid is less fragmented across donors,
the typical donor has stronger incentives to pursue development objectives rather than
commercial (or other) objectives. A given donor operating in multiple recipient countries
has a stronger incentive to pursue development objectives where it has a larger share of
the total aid market in a country. Our ndings are robust to alternative denitions of aid
tying, and to a strong set of controls (including donor and recipient xed eects). More-
over, instrumental variables tests in our panel data support the interpretation that higher
donor aid shares reduce aid tying. In our cross-sectional tests, aid tying rises initially as
the number of donors increases, but eventually begins to fall. This result - that aid tying is
lower not only when there are very few but also very many donors - is not predicted by our
theoretical approach, but nor is it consistent with concerns that fewer donors operating in
a country implies enhanced leverage on their part to tie more aid. Moreover, in our panel
data tests, higher donor aid shares are monotonically associated with lower aid tying.
Aid tying also varies inversely with the costs of aid tying (proxied empirically by donor
country size and per capita income), as predicted by the model. We also nd that aid to
the LDCs is less likely to be tied, indicating that the DAC recommendation on aid untying
to least developed countries has in
uenced donor behavior.
This paper adds to a growing body of empirical evidence on the adverse impact of
fragmented aid (Djankov et al., 2009; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Anderson, 2011). Frag-
mentation indicators (including donor aid shares) are only incomplete measures of the
division of labor among donors, and division of labor in turn does not comprise the entire
donor harmonization agenda. For example, we do not address fragmentation at the sec-
toral level, delegation of implementation of aid by one donor to another, or coordinating
donor missions or country analytic work. Our model and empirical tests aggregate all
ODA to the donor-recipient level. However, our approach could readily be extended to
sector-by-sector analyses in further research. For a given donor-recipient pair, one could
test the hypothesis that aid tying is lower in sectors where the donor's aid share is higher,
controlling for donor and sector xed eects.
Despite the limitations of our analysis, it reassuringly nds that the objective of untying
more aid does not con
ict with with at least one part of the harmonization agenda - increas-
ing geographic specialization of aid by donors. Results instead are consistent with the view
that reducing fragmentation - by increasing donors' share of aid in the countries they assist
- enhances their reputational stake in producing favorable development outcomes. Reduc-
ing aid fragmentation can occur without donors (individually or collectively) imposing their
own preferred geographic division of labor. The Rwandan government, for example, has
taken the lead in guiding its donors toward providing support in a more limited number
17of sectors, based on its own views of donors' comparative advantages. International Good
Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labor and Complementarity, issued by the
DAC in 2009, endorse this approach (OECD, 2011).
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20Table 1: Summary statistics model 4.1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
tied aid (1) 0.216 0.345 0 1
tied aid (2) 0.198 0.328 0 1
tied aid (3) 0.297 0.384 0 1
donor aid share 0.029 0.078 0 0.916
log of population 16.156 1.846 9.912 21
log of per capita income 0.028 1.159 -2.349 2.366
LDC dummy 0.352 0.478 0 1
log of total recipient aid 20.166 1.351 15.993 22.952
aid/GNI 0.126 0.2 0 1.664
control of corruption -0.528 0.524 -1.368 1.349
log of donor population 16.817 1.431 12.624 19.515
log of donor per capita income 10.568 0.312 8.947 11.408
log of total donor aid 7.84 1.227 2.88 9.675
log of distance 8.759 0.596 5.79 9.827
colonial tie dummy 0.048 0.214 0 1
multilateral aid share 0.537 0.226 0.03 0.989
21Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
tied aid (1) 0.391 0.26 0 0.998
tied aid (2) 0.143 0.143 0 0.674
tied aid (3) 0.267 0.208 0 0.914
No. of donors 26.20 10.003 1 43
No. of donors with aid > $250;000 20.007 9.858 1 37
log of population 15.660 2.074 9.912 21
log of per capita income 7.143 1.192 4.559 9.274
LDC dummy 0.323 0.47 0 1
log of total recipient aid 19.716 1.610 13.215 22.942
aid/GNI 0.125 0.198 0.00004 1.664
multilateral aid share (excl. EC) 0.410 0.277 0 1
EC aid share 0.151 0.175 0 0.784
Control of corruption -0.459 0.568 -1.368 1.349























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 5: 2SLS Panel regression
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4)
dependent variable rst stage Tied aid (1) Tied aid (2) Tied aid (3)
donor aid share . -.473 -.497 -.614
(.274) (.265) (.309)
log of distance -.023 . . .
(.007)
colonial tie .124 . . .
(.037)
multilateral aid share -.071 . . .
(.021)
log of population -.001 .012 .011 .009
(.003) (.006) (.006) (.007)
log of per capita income .003 .004 .001 .027
(.002) (.010) (.008) (.013)
LDC dummy .002 -.073 -.070 -.103
(.006) (.022) (.021) (.032)
log of total recipient aid -.0003 -.030 -.030 -.042
(.003) (.014) (.014) (.014)
aid/GNI .013 .007 -.021 .011
(.008) (.045) (.037) (.040)
donor xed eects yes yes yes yes
No. observations 1959 1959 1959 1959
F test of excl. instr. 6.68 . . .
F test p value .0024 . . .
R2 .197 .041 .043 .103
Overid test . .38 .29 .30
Note: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%;
constant not reported. Dependent variable is donor aid share in equation 1, and tied aid (denitions 1-3 respectively) in
equations 2-4.
25Table 6: cross sectional regression
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variation base specication Tied aid (2) Tied aid (3) Multilateral share added Tied aid (2)
No. of Donors .013 .009 .008 .014 .009
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.001)
log of population -.035 .027 -.023 .010 .021
(.023) (.014) (.022) (.018) (.015)
Log of per capita income .026 .033 -.001 .050 .029
(.031) (.016) (.024) (.020) (.016)
LDC dummy -.104 -.099 -.064 -.093 -.101
(.058) (.026) (.042) (.034) (.026)
log of total recipient aid -.036 -.057 -.052 -.056 -.054
(.033) (.022) (.034) (.025) (.022)
Aid/GNI -.118 .125 -.071 .114 .092
(.147) (.049) (.086) (.062) (.053)
multilateral aid share (excl. EC) . . . .153 -.027
(.077) (.062)
EC aid share . . . 1.251 -.176
(.060) (.049)
constant 1.183 .389 1.490 .393 .494
(.472) (.227) (.422) (.290) (.236)
No. of observations 133 133 133 133 133
R2 .166 .319 .172 .719 .356
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%.
Dependent variable is Tied aid denition 1, unless otherwise specied.
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